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INTRODUCTION
The Modern Corporation and Private Property1 famously sets out
two, apparently contradictory, lines of thought.2 One line, set out in Books
II and III, resonates comfortably with today’s shareholder-centered
corporate legal theory. Here, the book teaches that management duties
should be intensified in the wake of separated ownership and control:
managers should be viewed as trustees for the shareholders and should
exercise their wide-ranging powers for the shareholders’ benefit.3 The
other line of thought emerges in Books I and IV, where The Modern
Corporation encases this shareholder trust model in discussions of
corporate power and social welfare, discussions that resonate today with
those who advocate stepped-up government regulation of corporate
conduct and corporate social responsibility. Here, the separation of
ownership and control implies public responsibilities. The rhetoric flies
high: “[I]t is entirely possible . . . that the corporate profit stream in reality
no longer is private property, and that claims on it must be adjusted by
some test, other than that of property right.”4 The “rigid enforcement of
property rights” of passive shareholders would have to give way to a
“convincing system of community obligations.”5 Management, moreover,
must develop into a “purely neutral technocracy.”6 In order to meet these
* Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law, and Co-Director, Institute for Law & Economics,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Research Associate, European Corporate Governance
Institute. My thanks to Chuck O’Kelley and the participants at Berle X for many helpful comments.
1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (Macmillan 1933) (1932) [hereinafter BERLE & MEANS].
2. See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP.
L. 737 (2001).
3. Id. at 247–76.
4. Id. at 247.
5. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 356.
6. Id. at 353–56.
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technocratic obligations, corporate leaders should “set forth a program
comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their
public, and stabilization of business.”7
In previous work, Michael Wachter and I have shown that The
Modern Corporation’s contradictions can be explained by reference to the
context in which it was written.8 The book had a long gestation, spanning
the late 1920s, the Crash, and the early years of the Great Depression.
Many, including Berle, reordered their political economic views during
those years. The Modern Corporation’s various parts capture Berle at
different points in the timeline, beginning in the boom years as a friend of
the shareholders, and ending in the depths of the Depression as an advocate
of corporate advancement of national social welfare policies. Indeed, Berle
emerged as a leading figure in the national debate over the appropriate
policy response to the economic crisis, a debate just getting started upon
the book’s publication in the spring of 1932. Many looked to Franklin
Delano Roosevelt not only to win that year’s election but also to follow
the lead of many European leaders of the time and adopt corporatism as
the political economy of the United States. Berle, who joined FDR’s inner
circle during the 1932 campaign, was a leading advocate of a corporatist
approach.9 Wachter and I show that The Modern Corporation’s most
famous sequence, a final chapter (Book IV, Chapter IV), entitled “The
New Concept of the Corporation,”10 extensively overlaps the “New
Individualism” speech that Berle (and his wife Beatrice) wrote for FDR.11
The speech, the most radical of the 1932 campaign,12 presaged the
economic program of the New Deal, in particular the corporatist National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) enacted in June 1933.13
This essay casts additional light on The Modern Corporation’s
corporatist precincts, shifting attention to the book’s junior coauthor,
Gardiner C. Means. Means is accurately remembered as the generator of
Book I’s statistical showings—the description of deepening corporate
concentration and widening separation of ownership and control. He is
7. Id.
8. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins:
Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008).
9. Id. at 109–12.
10. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 352–57. For a textual explication of the chapter, see
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern
Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849 (2010).
11. Davis W. Houck, FDR’s Commonwealth Club Address: Redefining Individualism,
Adjudicating Greatness, 7 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 259, 259–60 (2004).
12. JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA
79 (1987); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Governor of N.Y., Address at the Commonwealth Club in San
Francisco, California (Sept. 23, 1932).
13. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 8, at 109–18.
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otherwise more notable for his absence than his presence in today’s
discussions of The Modern Corporation. This essay fills this gap,
describing the junior coauthor’s central concern—a theory of administered
prices set out in a Ph.D. dissertation Means submitted to the Harvard
economics department after the book’s publication.
The pricing theory articulated in the dissertation is barely alluded to
in The Modern Corporation, amounting to a sort of missing chapter. This
essay is on very good authority in so characterizing the material, for it
takes its cue from Means himself. In 1982, Means recorded his own
reflections on the book’s meaning, both as of the time of publication and
in retrospect. The occasion was a conference marking the book’s fiftieth
anniversary held at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University on
November 19 and 20.14 There, Means explained that corporate
concentration presented a problem of vastly greater magnitude than did
separated ownership and control and that the book’s central points could
be found not in the trust model or the descriptions of management
defalcation, but in an opaque passage at the end of Book I, Chapter III,15 a
passage that becomes intelligible only by reference to Means’s
dissertation.
For Means, the book and the dissertation were a single project. The
book’s statistical chapters went on to make up the lion’s share of the
dissertation. The theory of administered prices, omitted from the book but
included as the final part of the dissertation, lays out the statistical results’
implications for public policy. It amounted to a new description of the
economy’s pricing mechanism, a description built on a skeptical
evaluation of the economy’s self-corrective capability. Means believed
Adam Smith’s picture of supply, demand, and automatic market correction
had been partially eclipsed by inflexible pricing administered by corporate
managers. Growing corporate concentration exacerbated these
“administrated” prices’ distortionary effects.16 Means’s theory explained
the Great Depression’s persistence and yielded a detailed list of problems
to be addressed by a new regulatory state.17 Reference to the dissertation
explains in hard economic terms why the authors thought private property
needed to be pushed aside and just what they thought that “neutral
technocrats” could do to enhance social welfare.
Means would continue to refine his theory of administered prices for
the rest his career in the teeth of objections raised by more conventional
economists, both neoclassical and neo-Keynesian. The book project set the
14. Thomas Gale Moore, Introduction, 26 J. L. & ECON. 235 (1983).
15. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 45–46.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 78–90.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 94–99, 118.
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pattern of mainstream rejection: even as Means did receive a Ph.D. from
Harvard in 1933, his committee rejected the dissertation’s theoretical
part.18
Part I reconstructs the scene at the Hoover conference based on the
papers and comments later published in the Journal of Law and
Economics. It was a hothouse occasion, with the Chicago tribe gathered to
present work that took the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary to bury The
Modern Corporation then and forever. They did not succeed, even as some
of what they said resonates more loudly today than it did at the time the
papers were given. Means, a non-Chicago minority of one on the
publication list, stalwartly defended both the book and his later
contributions in a paper that amounts to an eleven o’clock reprise of a life’s
work.
Part II turns the clock farther back to the time of The Modern
Corporation’s composition and publication, describing the Berle–Means
collaboration and taking a closer look at what Means brought to the table
in the book’s Part I. The missing chapter is then sketched in by reference
to the unpublished dissertation and its early-stage articulation of a theory
of administered prices. The dissertation’s exposition delivers the reader to
the same points made in Book IV, Chapter IV, providing an essential
explication.
Part III describes Means’s later career, comparing it to that of his
erstwhile coauthor. Means was a civil servant, a practicing economist, an
entrepreneur, and a consultant, but never an academic. His fortunes as an
economist waned badly as the 1930s came to a close.19 Means was a
planner, and the planners’ influence declined in the wake of the failure of
the NIRA.20 They lost their place at the policy table at the end of the
decade, eclipsed by neo-Keynesians advocating fiscal stimulus. Economic
expansion after World War II meant further marginalization for Means,
even as Berle made adjustments that kept him on the national political
economic stage.
Part IV takes up the last years of Means’s career, when he enjoyed a
comeback due to an economy that stagnated even as inflation continued.
The mainstream macroeconomists whose ministrations had consigned
Means to the policy wilderness had no explanation for this “stagflation”
and, as a result, fell into disrepute. Means, however, did have a theory. He
had, back in the 1960s, reformulated his theory of administered prices to
explain the stagflation phenomenon.21 This returns us to Stanford in 1982,
18. See infra text accompanying note 71.
19. See infra text accompanying note 129.
20. Id.
21. See infra text accompanying note 147.
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where Means gave a paper that described his diagnosis of and solution for
stagflation.22 Ironically, inflation was fading and the stock market was
signaling economic expansion even as Means spoke. These developments
would in turn usher orthodox free market economics back to the forefront,
a return from the policy wilderness to which the market had been
consigned by The Modern Corporation a half century earlier.
I. PALO ALTO, 1982
The Hoover Institution conference featured such luminaries as
George Stigler,23 Harold Demsetz,24 Eugene Fama, Michael Jensen,25 and
Oliver Williamson,26 each in different ways pronouncing that the
separation of ownership and control no longer presented a problem, if
indeed it ever had. The thrust of the papers is that, contrary to Berle and
Means’s thesis, free markets and corporate contracting work together to
constrain management moral hazard. And, while ownership and control
had indeed separated, no structural infirmity should be diagnosed as a
result. Corporate control arrangements instead should be seen as rational
solutions to problems arising in the course of complex production.
Two conference papers launch direct attacks on The Modern
Corporation, going back to the status quo at the time it was published and
challenging its accuracy. One of these, from George Stigler and Claire
Friedland,27 interposes a headlong empirical challenge to the proposition
that self-perpetuating managers were in control and running their
companies in a self-serving way.28 The paper draws on Means’s statistical
arrangement of the country’s 200 largest companies into control categories
based on stock ownership.29 Means cordoned off private ownership,
majority shareholder control, and pyramiding into separate categories. He
added a fourth “minority control” category, in which a stockholder held
between 20% and 50% of the shares, and then put corporations that did
22. See infra text accompanying note 149.
23. See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle
and Means, 26 J. L. & ECON. 237 (1983).
24. See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 375 (1983).
25. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. L.
& ECON. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
26. See Oliver E. Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control,
26 J. L. & ECON. 351 (1983). Frank Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel, and Henry Manne also were in
attendance but do not seem to have presented. Id. The conference had been suggested by Stanford
Law’s Ken Scott. Moore, supra note 14.
27. Stigler & Friedland, supra note 23.
28. Id. at 247.
29. Not without complaint. See id. at 248 (noting that control contestability was not accounted
for).
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not fall into any of the categories into a fifth category called “management
control.”30 In his final tally, Means showed that 44% of American
corporations by number and 58% by value were under management
control.31
Stigler and Friedland tested the policy implications of Means’s
numbers, taking executive salary data from three separate studies
undertaken in the late 1920s and 1930s. Stigler and Friedland regressed
the salaries on the logarithm of the corporations’ assets and a dummy
variable for control type.32 Nothing that related the compensation
arrangements to the control types emerged from any of the three data
sets.33 The implication, said Stigler and Friedland, was that managers in
control did not set their own salaries, as Berle and Means had implied.34
Stigler and Friedland also gathered up statistics on corporate profitability
from the same periods. They hypothesized that, under the Berle and Means
analysis, the blockholder-controlled corporations should do better.35
Regression of the profitability numbers on corporate assets and control
types showed that control had a significant effect on performance in only
one of five regressions, once again purportedly falsifying Berle and
Means.36
The second direct attack came from Robert Hessen, a Hoover
Institution fellow.37 Hessen took Berle and Means to task for failing to
discuss other forms of business organization. With large partnerships run
by delegated managers, for example, there also was separation of
management and investment.38 Berle and Means similarly ignored the
property law doctrine applicable to noncorporate enterprise—joint
ownership. Reference to the law of joint ownership showed that comingled
property rights had been intrinsic to group enterprise long before the
twentieth century. It followed that the developments highlighted by Berle
and Means were matters of degree rather than changes in kind.39 The
conclusion was that separation of ownership and control was an ordinary
phenomenon in business enterprise; a phenomenon that, by itself, provided
no justification for government regulation.40
30. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 67–84.
31. Id. at 109.
32. Stigler & Friedland, supra note 23, at 247–54.
33. Id. at 252, 254.
34. Id. at 238–39.
35. Id. at 254.
36. Id.
37. See Robert Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J. L.
& ECON. 273 (1983).
38. Id. at 281–82.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 285.
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Means made the comment on Hessen, shrugging off the paper with
comments that applied equally to the attack by Stigler and Friedland. Said
Means, by focusing only on the separation of ownership and control41
Hessen was distorting the book’s message.42 The Modern Corporation,
Means said, had never concluded that big, management-controlled
corporations cannot be engines of efficiency. Neither did the book say that
directors had no right to control corporate property they do not own, nor
that the ownership of shares somehow falls outside of the private property
system.43 Nor did the book purport to describe fundamental changes in the
basic characteristics of business organizations, making Hessen’s attack
irrelevant.44
The question assayed in the book, according to Means, was instead
whether public policies formulated in an era when enterprises had been
small could be expected to continue to work well when a significant part
of production was conducted by giant firms with dispersed owners.45 What
mattered in the book, accordingly, was less the discussion of separated
ownership and control than the discussion of increasing concentration—
Means’s showing that one-third of the national wealth lay in the hands of
200 large corporations and projection that, given continuation of the
present rate of growth of that relative share, seventy percent of economic
activity would be carried on by 200 corporations by 1950.46 From this
showing, said Means, the book concluded that the modern corporate
economy had superseded the classical, Smithian picture of a successfully
self-correcting market economy. New concepts of economic relations
were needed.47
Means suggested that an observer really interested in understanding
The Modern Corporation should consult pages 45 to 46 thereof, which set
forth a series of five points as a conclusion to the description of
concentrating economic power in Book I, Chapter III.48 The points merit
a close look. First came a recommendation about matters for future
inquiry: we now needed to study the behavior of large producing units
rather than the behavior of the economy’s small competitors.49 Second
came an observation about competition—the nature of competition had
41. Gardiner C. Means, Hessen’s “Reappraisal,” 26 J. L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1983) [hereinafter
Means, Hessen’s Reappraisal].
42. Id. at 297.
43. Id. at 299.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 300.
46. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 9, 37, 47.
47. Means, Hessen’s Reappraisal, supra note 41, at 297.
48. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 18–46.
49. Id. at 45.
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changed and duopoly now mattered more than classical free markets.50
Third, the book noted that an increasing proportion of production was for
“use” rather than for “sale,” implying that the profit motive was no longer
driving decision making within producing companies.51 Fourth, the nature
of capital had changed so as to be comprised more of going concern value
than tangible asset value.52 Fifth, blind market forces no longer governed
the economy and economic power was instead concentrated in a small
number of hands, making corporations social institutions.53
Cross-referencing Means’s comment at Hoover to pages 45 and 46
leaves one in a typical Modern Corporation state of confusion; a condition
akin to that experienced by a first-time reader of the vague sentences in
Book IV, Chapter IV. The longer one looks at this fivefold assertion, the
more questions one has. How exactly had the nature of competition
changed? The reference to a “duopoly” that mattered more than the
classical free market provided no explication because the “duopoly” was
not otherwise defined in Book I, Chapter III. Why was it so important that
big, vertically integrated companies now produced goods that they
consumed themselves rather than producing everything for an exterior
market? How did this somehow eliminate the constraints of product
market competition? Since when did rising going concern values relative
to asset values denude the profit motive of motivational force, making for
a policy problem? And wasn’t that final reference to power in the hands
of a few just the standard invocation against corporate bigness typical of
mid-twentieth century antitrust? The book offers no answers to these
questions.
But Means did answer the questions elsewhere. The five-point list at
the end of Book I, Chapter III was a gesture in the direction of the
theoretical part of Means’s dissertation, the content of which is described
in this essay’s next Part.
II. NEW YORK, 1927–1933
Adolf Berle first took up residence at Columbia Law School, where
he would spend the rest of his career, in 1927.54 He started on a soft money
basis, occupying an office and doing adjunct teaching at the business
school while he waited for a permanent law school faculty line to become
available.55 Interim support came from a Rockefeller Foundation grant for
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 45–46.
53. Id. at 46.
54. William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the New Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP.
L. 737, 750 (2001).
55. Id.
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a research project that eventually became The Modern Corporation.56 The
grant stipulated an “interdisciplinary” study of corporations to be
conducted with an economist.57 Berle chose Means, then a graduate
student, later describing him as a “statistical and economic research
assistant,”58 who contributed the book’s empirical studies of corporate
concentration and dispersed share ownership. Berle eventually conceded
co-authorship and one-third of the royalties.59
Means, although a student, was only one year younger than Berle60
and a family friend. Berle and Means were “old bunkmates” from their
training at the army’s officer candidate school at Plattsburg, New York
during World War I.61 Their respective spouses, Beatrice Bishop and
Caroline Ware, had been undergraduate friends at Vassar. Bishop and
Ware had remained close and jointly intervened to get Means onto the
Rockefeller project.62
Means’s interest in the workings of the economy is said to date from
his experience as a relief organizer in post-war Turkey. He supervised a
village of 1,000 orphans and there observed a market-dominated
production process that perfectly manifested Adam Smith’s description of
supply, demand, and price discovery.63 The interesting thing, for Means,
was a marked contrast with what he understood of production and pricing
in the United States.64
Upon his return, Means studied at the Lowell Textile Institute65 and
then went into business, starting up a factory that manufactured fine
blankets, a business he ran from 1922 to 1929.66 Means found himself able
to set product prices at will, deepening the sense of divergence between
56. The book project, the grant, and the Columbia appointment were tightly bound together. The
grant came first, awarded by a new not-for-profit, the Social Science Research Council, which in turn
was funded by Rockefeller. William Z. Ripley, much admired by both Berle and Means, was on the
Council’s board. The grant was conditioned on an academic appointment. Berle, the grant in hand, but
not the appointment, shopped himself first to Yale, which had no interest. But Harlan Stone, the dean
at Columbia, took the bait. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1918–1971, at 20–21
(Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973) [hereinafter BERLE, NAVIGATING].
57. SCHWARZ, supra note 12, at 51.
58. Id.; BERLE, NAVIGATING, supra note 56, at 21.
59. SCHWARZ, supra note 12, at 58–59.
60. Berle lived from 1895 to1972; Means lived from 1896 to 1988.
61. BERLE, NAVIGATING, supra note 56, at 21; THEODORE ROSENOF, ECONOMICS IN THE LONG
RUN: NEW DEAL THEORISTS & THEIR LEGACIES, 1933–1993, at 28 (1997). He later trained as a pilot
and had a reputation as a daredevil. Id.
62. ROSENOF, supra note 61, at 29.
63. Gardiner C. Means, Remarks upon the Receipt of Veblen-Commons Award, 9 J. ECON.
ISSUES 149, 149–50 (1975) [hereinafter Means, Remarks].
64. ANNE FIROR SCOTT, PAULI MURRAY & CAROLINE WARE: FORTY YEARS OF LETTERS IN
BLACK & WHITE 4 (2006).
65. ROSENOF, supra note 61, at 29.
66. Means, Remarks, supra note 63, at 150.
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Smith’s description and contemporary real-world operations.67 Multitasking as he ran the blanket business, he enrolled in Harvard Business
School. He there fell under the influence of W.Z. Ripley and emerged with
a master’s degree in 1927.68 Enrollment in the doctoral program at Harvard
followed immediately, even as Means also signed on with Berle at
Columbia,69 with the work produced for the book substantially
overlapping the chapters in the Ph.D. dissertation. Like Berle, Means
worked on FDR’s 1932 presidential campaign.70 As noted above, the Ph.D.
was duly granted in 1933 but only at the pain of the rejection of the
dissertation’s theoretical discussion,71 the material obliquely referred to at
the end of Part I, Chapter III of The Modern Corporation.
Means titled the dissertation The Corporate Revolution. Its statistical
part, like that of The Modern Corporation, demonstrated (1) that an
increasing amount of economic activity is conducted by corporations, (2)
that super-sized corporations played an increasing role, (3) that share
ownership was increasingly dispersed, and (4) that an increasing number
of large corporations were manager-managed.72
The theoretical part of the dissertation described the implications of
these findings for classical economic orthodoxy. In the orthodox picture,
supply and demand set the prices of goods traded in free markets. There
results a disciplined, self-correcting economic system in which upward
swings automatically follow economic downturns caused by falling
demand. External shocks occur but do not in the long run distort the
system’s fundamental soundness; government intervention accordingly
should be avoided.73 The Great Depression cast doubt on these confident
predictions and the resulting noninterventionist prescription.
Means posed an alternative approach. He had reached the conclusion
that the orthodox picture, which worked well for the simple trading

67. SCOTT, supra note 64, at 4.
68. WARREN J. SAMUELS & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, GARDINER C. MEANS: INSTITUTIONALIST AND
POST KEYNESIAN 7 (1990).
69. Id.; GARDINER C. MEANS, THE CORPORATE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: ECONOMIC REALITY
VS. ECONOMIC THEORY 15 (1962) [hereinafter MEANS, REVOLUTION].
70. SCOTT, supra note 64, at 6.
71. ROSENOF, supra note 61, at 29.
72. MEANS, REVOLUTION, supra note 69, at 15. The reference is to a summary of the thesis that
Means published in a 1962 collection of essays. The remaining copy of the thesis, a typescript with
handwritten corrections and changes, does not preserve the chapters that found their way into the book.
An unpaginated sheet, inserted after page 8B, states that those chapters are omitted because they
appeared elsewhere. Gardiner C. Means, The Corporate Revolution, insertion after 8B (1933)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Gardiner C. Means Papers,
Series I, Box 2) [hereinafter Means, Corp. Revolution].
73. See ROSENOF, supra note 61, at 5.
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situations he observed in Turkey, no longer accurately described the
working of a complex modern economy.74
His dissertation offered four broad points to this end. First, markets
for many products no longer set prices, which were instead administered
by corporate managers.75 Second, the costs of goods sold were no longer
determined by the production process but were instead indeterminate.76
Third, the process of saving and investment was now dualistic, with a
corporate side and an individual side.77 And fourth, the profit motive no
longer sufficed as an explanation for production activity.78
A. The Administered Price and Administrative Competition
The first point, the rise of the administered price, was primus inter
pares. Means distinguished classical market pricing from modern
corporate pricing. In the classical market, the price did not precede the
trade but was instead determined by the trade as supply met demand.79
Large corporations priced differently; managers would fix the price of the
good in advance of the sale, and this “administered” (or “engineered”)
price would stick for a period of time.80 As the corporate producing sector
grew, prices in the overwhelming majority of conventional markets for
manufactured goods became fixed over time. The product markets, as a
result, ceased to equate supply and demand, except by coincidence.81
It followed that pictures of economic activity in standard demand
curves no longer were accurate, for they assumed perfect price flexibility
where it did not necessarily exist.82 Not that supply and demand for a given
product remained inflexibly apart forever. There would be a long run
tendency for the proportionate discrepancy to decrease, but an absolute
discrepancy would persist without decrease.83
There was a stark follow-up point: a disequilibrium between supply
and demand caused by a drop of demand did not result in a fall in price.
Instead of lowering the price in response to a falling demand, a rational
corporate manager would make an internal adjustment, cutting back on

74. Means, Remarks, supra note 63, at 150–51.
75. Means, Corp. Revolution, supra note 72, at 124–25.
76. Id. at 146–51.
77. Id. at 152–59.
78. Id. at 160–76.
79. Id. at 125.
80. Id. at 134–35.
81. Id. at 135.
82. Id. at 125.
83. Id. at 140.
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levels of production and reducing levels of employment matters as to
which flexibility had been retained.84
Means’s discussion had a remarkable implication. Given the zone of
administrative discretion he described, the choice to cut back on
production instead of competing on price could even make the firm more
valuable. The further implication was that, as Means had noted on page 45
of The Modern Corporation, market competition had changed in
character.85 It had become less intense as the various producing sectors
became more and more concentrated86—Means would later call this
“administrative competition.”87 The duopoly to which Means cryptically
referred on page 45 now comes clearly into view. Means divided the
economy into two sectors: one with traditional market-determined prices,
the market for agricultural products being the prime example, and the other
sector with administered prices.88 As the administered sector grew in
relation to economy as whole, imbalance and instability resulted.89
This analysis led directly to an explanation for the Great
Depression’s depth and persistence. Means articulated it in a famous
article published in 1935.90 In the classical picture of the economy, if
demand fell but the money stock was constant, prices fell. The price drop
increased the purchasing power of money, stimulating demand and
restoring full employment. In the modern corporate economy, in contrast,
inflexible prices prevented automatic correction from occurring in one-

84. Id. (“The flow of goods into any one of these reservoirs may not be closely articulated with
the flow of goods out of the reservoir, with the result that at particular times the reservoirs may to a
certain extent be filled up or depleted without any effect on price. In such a situation, the effect of
fluctuations in demand is to speed up or slow down the flow through these reservoirs, working finally
back to the factors of production themselves, where, because the rates of wages and interest are also
administratively determined, the immediate effect is to throw out of use the factors of production rather
than to reduce their price.”).
85. See supra text accompanying note 50.
86. Gardiner C. Means, Corporate Power in the Marketplace, 26 J. L. & ECON. 467, 469, 470
(1983) [hereinafter Means, Corporate Power]. Although corporate size and concentration were at the
descriptive center of Means’s theory, he differed sharply with the economic description that motivates
antitrust analysis, which starts with the classical free market picture and then identifies, and in some
cases prohibits, exceptions thereto. ROSENOF, supra note 61, at 36–37. For Means, administered prices
were a natural outgrowth of complex production. Once placed under regulatory control, the
concentration would be rendered benign.
87. Means, Corporate Power, supra note 86, at 470.
88. Id. at 467, 470.
89. Means, Corp. Revolution, supra note 72, at 143 (describing unemployment and the
consequent falloff of demand).
90. Gardiner C. Means, Price Inflexibility and the Requirements of a Stabilizing Monetary
Policy, 30 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 401, 405 (1935) [hereinafter Means, Price Inflexibility].
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half of the economy, retarding a return to stability.91 Means would call for
monetary expansion as a corrective.92
B. The Indeterminacy of Cost
Let us now return to the thesis and its second point—the
indeterminacy of product cost. This amounted to a more particular
observation about the pricing process; an observation that underscored the
picture of an administered price and its destabilization of classical
economic assumptions. In the classical picture, price minus cost equals
profit and the profit motive is the engine driving the economic train.
Product cost and market price together determine production and
employment decisions. To say that cost is indeterminate inserts managerial
discretion into this basic equation, undercutting the motivational story and
making the manager an independent decisionmaker.
Means’s more particular case devolved on overhead charges. He
characterized them as “joint costs,” meaning that the firm experienced
them on an aggregate basis and not as attached to any particular product.93
As he saw it, in a large operation, readily attributable product costs were
at a minimum with a lot of the cost arbitrarily lumped into overhead (and
depreciation), with these items representing a steadily rising proportion of
overall costs.94 A producer would accordingly view the profit implications
of a fall in demand on a firm-wide basis rather than tying its profit
calculations to each unit of output produced. This insulated the producer’s
economic behavior from determination by the price point in the market.
C. Saving and Investment
The third point—the duality of saving—divides the world into
corporate savers and individual savers. The corporate savers invest in
capital goods while the individual savers invest in interests in capital
goods, also known as corporate stocks and bonds.95 The capital goods and
the securities are priced in different markets. Distortionary effects follow:
even though the value in both markets comes from the same capital goods,
prices in the two markets could move in opposite directions—once again
negating the standard account, in this case the one from macroeconomics.
Means described a number of distorted scenarios. For example, he
posited a negative shock that triggers a fall in demand and in prices.
91. Means, Corporate Power, supra note 86, at 404.
92. Means, Price Inflexibility, supra note 90, at 409–13.
93. Means, Corp. Revolution, supra note 72, at 147–49 (setting out examples of cost accounting).
94. Id. at 146, 149–50. Numerous examples are offered: the cost of goods sold in a shoe store,
id. at 147; a woolen mill, id. at 148–49; meatpacking, id. at 150.
95. Id. at 152–53.
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Corporations, as a result, stop investing and issuing new securities.
Meanwhile, individuals are still saving, bidding up the prices of a static
supply of investment securities. Securities prices thus rise even as the
economy stalls, until such time as savings decrease or corporations once
again issue new securities.96
Alternatively, Means posed that the shock and the cessation of
corporate investment could cause savings to fall and force many
individuals to consume out of their accumulated stocks of savings.97
Downward pressure on stock prices would result. The value of the savings
stock would fall with them, so that the savings retrenchment would not
lead to an increase in the amount of goods actually consumed by
individuals (and, by hypothesis, an economic recovery). Although the
individuals had in substance invested their savings in corporate capital
goods, the individuals had no way to access these investments directly for
retrenchment purposes—their access was limited to firm-issued securities,
the prices of which were falling below intrinsic value in a separate,
disconnected market. Access to the real value of individual savings was
being blocked by the separation of ownership and control:
Only by the intermediary action of corporate control, would this be
possible. If no such action by control occurs, the value of securities
will melt away while the goods in which the securities represent an
interest, though badly wanted by the community, will remain on the
shelves of the corporation.98

It seemed, then, that most important saving decisions being made in
the economy were in the hands of corporate managers rather than saving
individuals. The managers controlled not only the capital goods
themselves but the decision as to the issuance of new securities for
purchase by individual savers.99 Serious disequilibrium followed for the
economy when the two markets failed to move in consonance.100 Indeed,
Means’s scenario suggests an explanation for an apparently endless Great
Depression following on the heels of a stock market crash.
D. The Profit Motive
Administered pricing and the separation of ownership and control,
taken in conjunction, yield the fourth point, which concerns the profit
motive. In the classical picture, the desire for profits motivates the
entrepreneurs who produce the goods. Things work differently in the
96. Id. at 154.
97. Id. at 156–57.
98. Id. at 159.
99. Id. at 149.
100. Id.
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modern corporation under separated ownership and control: the
shareholder-owners take the profits even as they are unable to perform the
function of monitoring to assure efficient operations. This breaks the logic
of the classical picture, in which the firm and its profits “belong” to the
shareholders.101
Means surveyed the day’s cutting-edge theory of the firm, describing
two opposing points of view. Profits were thought to have three
components: return on invested capital, the wages of management, and a
third residual category of “pure” profits.102 Some thought of pure profits
as reward for risk taking and thus properly directed to the shareholders,
while others saw pure profits as a reward for the “integrating force” of
corporate leadership and thus properly directed to the managers.103 It
followed that the profit motive that drove the classical entrepreneurial
business had been separated.104
Meanwhile, the law did not provide clear instructions as to an
appropriate allocation of the profits. Corporate plundering had entered the
fact pattern, as stressed in The Modern Corporation.105 Even so, Means
downplayed the importance of management’s fiduciary defalcations. He
instead stressed market and institutional limits on management discretion.
Sufficient returns had to be directed to risk-bearing shareholders to keep
the market receptive to new issues of shares. At the same time, because
proxy fights made management power contestable, managers had to keep
their “phlegmatic” shareholders reasonably contented.106 Accordingly,
risk bearing capital did get a cognizable cut of pure profits.
But who should receive the residual of the residual (termed “ex risk
profit” by Means)? “The answer,” said Means, “must be sought in
economic and social considerations.”107 He saw no reason to direct this
wealth to the shareholders, who performed no further economic function
after having been compensated for bearing risk. Applying economic logic,
the scales thus apparently tipped in the managers’ direction. Since they
were performing an economic function as they operated the firms,
compensation with “ex risk profit” had an apparent incentive-based
justification.108

101. Id. at 165.
102. Id. at 161.
103. Id. at 162–64.
104. Id. at 165.
105. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 311–12.
106. Id. at 166–68.
107. Id. at 171.
108. Id. at 172–73.
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Means rejected this economic logic,109 however, and redirected the
discussion to the speculative territory on which he and Berle closed The
Modern Corporation. The rejected logic only made sense on the classical
assumptions that the profit motive would spur efficient production and that
a competitive economy would effectively regulate the producers.
Concentration of economic power negated both assumptions. In addition,
there were diminishing returns on the management incentive side as everlarger profit sums would go into a smaller number of pockets. Meanwhile,
concentration enhanced barriers to entry and diminished competitive
control.110
Means held open the ultimate question regarding the allocation of
profits, closing with a question and a suggestion. The question was
whether it was still plausible that the profit motive held out a socially
effective method of inducing entrepreneurship.111 The implicit answer was
no. As to what to do with ex-risk profits, maybe the question was whether
such profits should be made at all, with managers being modeled not as
entrepreneurs but as professionals with public duties.112 Whatever the
answers to the many open questions, Means was certain of one thing—that
his depiction of administered pricing and competition would provide
essential assistance in the answers’ eventual derivation.113
E. Comments
Add all this up and one returns to The Modern Corporation with
answers to many of its open questions. We now have a microeconomic
basis for understanding the fifth assertion made in Book I, Chapter III:
Adam Smith’s invisible hand no longer governed the economy because
the power to price goods—indeed, the decision whether to produce the
goods in the first place—now was vested in a small number of visible
hands. The shift denuded price competition of its disciplinary effect,
diluted the incentive effect of the profit motive, and perhaps most
importantly, prevented the economy from self-correcting in the wake of a
negative shock.
Corporations, viewed against this dysfunctional microeconomic
background, fairly could be characterized as social institutions—
institutions in obvious need of regulation. Furthermore, Means’s analysis
handed a very specific directive to the regulator-to-be: figure out how to

109. Id. at 171.
110. Id. at 175–76.
111. Id. at 173–74.
112. Id. at 174.
113. Id. at 176.
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manage the price in the interest of the economy as a whole rather than in
the exclusive interest of the producing entity.
The Modern Corporation would have made a lot more sense had the
theoretical points in the thesis been included as the final chapter of Part I.
Why were the points not included? Michael Wachter and I speculated that
Berle, as an aspiring FDR Brains Truster vying against others to influence
the policies to be articulated by a still-undecided future boss, would have
been cautious about laying out a detailed policy program in public.114 A
similar motivation could have been in play in regards to the discussion of
administered pricing.115 Or, in view of the tentative nature of the policy
assertions made in the much better articulated economics of the
dissertation, perhaps Berle and Means were astute enough to know that
they did not know the answers, just the direction of future inquiry. There
also could have been ordinary editorial and authorial concerns. Means’s
theory would have added to the book’s complexity while simultaneously
attracting criticism and prompting skepticism.
There may also have been a timing problem. The book was in press,
with the final galleys submitted by the authors, by April 1932.116 The
dissertation was submitted in the following year.117 Perhaps the traces of
the dissertation that we see on pages 45 and 46 of the book reflect an earlier
stage of the project, while the surviving dissertation draft displays the
same ideas at a more mature stage of development.
A comparison of the five points on pages 45 and 46 with the
exposition in the dissertation supports this inference. Book I, Chapter III,
point three—the increase in production for use rather than sale—does not
reappear in the thesis, apparently having been replaced by the discussion
of cost accounting and overhead. Interestingly, both points—production
for use and cost accounting—are probative of a trend toward internal price
administration and away from external market control. It seems that Means
at some point decided that reference to accounting did the job better than
reference to vertical integration. A similar association can be suggested
between Book I, Chapter III, point four—the trend toward going concern
over asset value—and the dissertation’s discussion of saving and
investment. In this case, the comparison suggests considerable analytical
114. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 8, at 120–22.
115. Means would later note that The Modern Corporation made no attempt to address the basic
question as to how to restore the economy. See Means, Corporate Power, supra note 86, at 469.
116. Letter from Adolf Berle to Gilbert Montague (Apr. 20, 1932) (on file with the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library, Adolph Berle Papers, General Correspondence 1928–1940, Box 9) (noting that the
galleys were in and that publication was imminent).
117. This is speculation based on the fact that the degree was granted, and the theoretical chapter
rejected, in 1933. The dissertation draft amongst the Gardiner Means Papers at the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library is undated. See Means, Corp. Revolution, supra note 72.
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advancement over time. The book’s emphasis on the primacy of going
concern over asset value does suggest that large corporate producers have
special characteristics. But one can think of qualifications: going concern
value also exceeds asset value at a mom and pop store. Nor does the value
point by itself show us that the classical picture no longer describes either
pricing or incentives in a large corporation. The discussion in the
dissertation accomplishes much, much more, identifying different markets
for the same value source (one for assets and the other for going concern
value), bringing in the separation of ownership and control to bear on
Means’s pricing theory and pointing to concrete distortionary possibilities.
One suspects, then, that the theory of the administered price
remained at such an early stage of articulation as to preclude its inclusion
in a book published in early 1932. In this scenario, Means’s chapter is
missing because it was a rough work in process, or perhaps had not yet
been written. But the omission might have occurred even if the dissertation
draft had been on the table in early 1932. The presentation in the
dissertation amounted only to a first crack at what would become for
Means a monumental, career-long theoretical enterprise. There is no basis
on which to infer that Means deemed the version in the dissertation ready
for publication.
III. WASHINGTON, 1933–1988
Berle stayed in New York after Roosevelt’s inauguration in 1933,
not having received an offer of a sufficiently important job in the new
administration.118 Means, in contrast, went to Washington, where he
remained the rest of his life. He first served as an economic advisor to the
Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace. He also served on the National
Recovery Association’s (NRA’s) Consumer Advisory Board. In 1935, he
moved over to the Industrial Section of the Natural Resources Committee;
finally, in the early 1940s, he worked at the Bureau of the Budget.119 He

118. SCHWARZ, supra note 12, at 81–82 (“It surprised many people when Berle became assistant
secretary of nothing in 1933.”).
119. ROSENOF, supra note 61, at 31. Means died in the same house in Vienna, Virginia he and
his wife, Caroline Ware, had purchased in 1935. Glenn Fowler, Gardiner C. Means, 91, Is Dead;
Pricing Theory Aided U.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1988) [hereinafter Means Obituary],
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/18/obituaries/gardiner-c-means-91-is-dead-pricing-theory-aidedus-policy.html [https://perma.cc/DH5A-KEED]. They called the 70-acre property “The Farm.”
SCOTT, supra note 64, at 8. Means and Ware donated most of The Farm to the Northern Virginia
Regional Park Authority in 1980, retaining their house, which Ware donated after Means’s death in
1988. John Bohn, Estate Built of History Becomes Public Garden, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 1988),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1988/12/15/estate-built-of-history-becomes-publicgarden/6bf7fe0a-0f37-4f87-8310-36dd4751a385/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.290fcd42aba4 [https://
perma.cc/Q8FG-KM3V]. Today the property is known as Meadowlark Gardens. See Medowlark
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left the government in 1943 and landed in the think tank sector, first as an
associate with the Committee for Economic Development from 1943 to
1958 and then with the Fund for the Republic from 1957 to 1959. He
remained an entrepreneur: in 1951 he started a business raising and selling
zoysia grass, an enterprise he continued until 1963, when he was 67 years
old. He thereafter continued to consult and write until his death in 1988,
at 91 years of age.120
The one thing Means never did was take up an academic
appointment. An outsider in his own profession, he never sought one.121
Although he thought of himself as a macroeconomist, he tends to be
remembered as an institutionalist.122 There are good reasons for the
institutional appellation. Like Thorsten Veblen and the other
institutionalists, he engaged in historical evolutionary analysis of the
economy, and his explanations elevated institutional structure over
external factors.123 As such, his period of greatest influence was during
FDR’s first term, when the NIRA was put into place and planning
correctives to free markets had their greatest prestige.
It bears noting that Means and the other leading institutionalists in
the administration, Rexford Tugwell and Mordecai Ezekiel, disapproved
of the NIRA’s planning apparatus. The NIRA’s executory arm, the NRA,
featured sectoral planning by private actors under public auspices.124 For
Means and his cohort, coordination needed to be effected on an overall
basis in a process free of domination by business people—they, after all,
were the very administrators whose pricing decisions needed to be
overruled.125 In Means’s more particular corporatist vision, a public
agency should promulgate price and production policies generated as the
balanced outcome of bargaining among representatives of business, labor,
consumers, and government.126
The NIRA’s collapse came at the expense of the institutionalists’
reputations. Planning had failed, and no one was interested in the even
more invasive iteration they advocated.127 Moreover, neo-Keynesian
economists were on the scene promising a less heavy-handed mode of
economic correction. Keynes diagnosed the problem underlying the Great
Parks, History, NOVA PARKS, https://www.novaparks.com/parks/meadowlark-botanical-gardens/
history [https://perma.cc/9M5M-2BSR].
120. SAMUELS & MEDEMA, supra note 68, at 7–8; SCOTT, supra note 64, at 169.
121. Id. at 143.
122. ROSENOF, supra note 61, at 30–31; see also SAMUELS & MEDEMA, supra note 69, at 3–4
(describing Means as an institutionalist and as post-Keynesian).
123. ROSENOF, supra note 61, at 5–6, 13–14.
124. Id. at 39.
125. Id. at 15, 38.
126. Id. at 39–40.
127. Id. at 17.
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Depression as a climate of weak investment incentives incident to the
modern economy and prescribed a cure in the form of government
stimulus of investment.128 Means’s period of influence ended abruptly in
1939, when, after a sharp debate, the neo-Keynesian economist Alvin H.
Hansen, who had an investment-based theory of secular stagnation,
displaced him at the National Resources Planning Board.129
Hansen’s Keynesianism would be eclipsed in turn in the post-war
economic expansion—secular stagnation no longer made sense once
people were moving to Levittown and watching Leave It to Beaver on their
new televisions. Keynesians still ruled, but in a new fusion with orthodox
economic theory. The economy was now deemed to be fundamentally
sound, as had been the case before 1929, but also was deemed to need
short-run fine tuning pursuant to a mechanistic formula.130 Means, whose
central ideas remained in place through his adult life, drifted further into
the wilderness.131
Berle, in contrast, made a few crucial post-war adjustments and
continued to occupy the national stage as a leading public intellectual.132
He told a happy story. New Deal reforms had solved the accountability
problem identified in The Modern Corporation.133 The management
incentive problem was under control, even though managers remained
insulated from capital market pressures.134 A big stick state watched over
them instead.135 To keep the state at bay, managers were forced to keep the
public satisfied with jobs and growth.136 Thus constrained, managers
amounted to quasi-civil servants.137 We had, in effect, arrived at the higher

128. Id. at 22.
129. Id. at 42, 66–68.
130. Id. at 2.
131. SAMUELS & MEDEMA, supra note 69, at 5 (noting also that Means made slight
reformulations in response to criticism and changes in circumstances).
132. See generally Robert B. Thompson, Adolf Berle During the New Deal: The Brain Truster
as an Intellectual Jobber, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663 (2019).
133. ADOLPH A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 82, 91 (1963) [hereinafter
BERLE, REPUBLIC] (describing an “American economic republic” in which the state and the economy
were interdependent, with the state taking ultimate responsibility for economic results and exercising
the higher level of power).
134. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 36–37 (1954)
[hereinafter BERLE, 20TH CENTURY].
135. The state intervened only to stabilize the organizational lines and performance of private
producers. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 133, at 99.
136. Id. at 169; ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 122 (1959) [hereinafter BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY].
137. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 133, at 88. Berle’s description had a theoretical counterpart
in JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). Galbraith’s picture leaves the
competing groups free to make their own rules, subject to government intervention to assure that
excessive power does not accrue to one group. Free competition is allowed to operate on a day-to-day
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evolutionary plateau called for in Book IV, Chapter IV and the close of
Means’s dissertation.
Interestingly, Berle’s post-war descriptions of the economy
amounted to notes on a lecture by Gardiner Means. Product markets, said
Berle, were incomplete, and price did not match supply and demand. The
industrial production machine, he asserted, could bring forth limitless
goods138 but also presented persistent problems. Overcapacity gave
management the discretion to set the level of production wherever it
wanted; at the same time, labor tended toward oversupply. This led to an
unpalatable either-or: either too many goods were produced or
unemployment was too high. Market correction implied catastrophic
fluctuations and intolerable costs: starvation for labor and bankruptcy for
firms.139 The solution to the problem lay in a planned equation of supply
to demand.140 Absent planning, asserted Berle, the economic conditions
that had brought about the Depression would have recurred in the early
1960s.141 A point of difference with Means opened up only at this point in
the discussion. Means, as we have seen, had never been satisfied with the
mode and character of federal price regulation. Berle was content with
private planning in the industrial oligopolies142 accompanied by direct
government intervention in the regulated industries.143
The economic and political conditions that supported Berle’s
sanguine political economy were fast disappearing at the time of his death

level, but in an administered economy that guards against excessive competition. The need for
countervailing power precludes resort to market competition to choose the winners.
138. ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 176 (1967) [hereinafter BERLE, POWER].
Berle expressed no concerns about incentives to innovate within big firms—there was no way to tell
whether development worked better inside or outside; the important thing was that the capital was
there inside. Id. at 209–13.
139. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 133, at 78–79, 82. Berle observed that, absent regulation,
conditions in 1962 resembled those of 1930, heralding another depression. Id. at 217.
140. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 134, at 11–12.
141. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 133, at 217.
142. His description of the oligopolies was pure Means: within a concentrated industry,
competition amounted more to a struggle for power to balance supply and demand than to a struggle
to gain market share through price competition. Competition continued within the industry in the
limited sense that one firm could not set prices at will. Id. at 103–04. Meanwhile, abuse of economic
power called for strong governmental responses. BERLE, POWER, supra note 136, at 129.
143. Industry-specific regulatory mechanisms controlling entry, exit, and prices remained in
place over banking, ground, and air transport, public utilities, broadcasting, petroleum, and shipping.
BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 134, at 49.

612

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:591

in 1971.144 Their complete disappearance in the stagflation of the 1970s145
had negative implications for his posthumous reputation. He lingers in the
memory more for The Modern Corporation and his work on corporate law
than for the post-war political economy that made up his main body of
work. Stagflation, which combined recession with inflation, also brought
down post-war Keynesianism, a theory which had no way to explain it.
Ironically, stagflation also meant vindication for Means, who did
have a theory. Means had reemerged as a giver of Congressional testimony
when inflation became a policy concern in the 1960s.146 He was also the
first economist to identify and describe a bout of stagflation, a task
performed in a Preface to the 1967 edition of The Modern Corporation.147
The next generation—the post-Keynesian macroeconomists—would view
him as a valued precursor.148
IV. PALO ALTO, 1982 AND BEYOND
Means took his ideas on stagflation to the Hoover Institution
conference in 1982, combining them with reflections on The Modern
Corporation and the Great Depression in a symposium piece that
amounted to a reprise of the high points of a long, distinguished career.
It was as if his Ph.D. dissertation was getting a new section to account
for recent developments in practice. Means offered a two-part analysis. In
the first part, Means explained why a rational manager might find it
convenient to raise prices even as demand was falling—a practice he
called “perverse pricing.”149 He sketched out various scenarios. In one
case, a manager working with fixed costs, variable costs, and a total profit
target sees demand and output fall. Raising the price makes sense so long
as it facilitates attainment of the profit target.150 Alternatively, the manager
is comfortable with a fall in demand because overcapacity deters new
entrants even as a price increase protects return on capital.151 In a third
144. Berle, a New Dealer until the end, had parted company with the New Left, which didn’t
buy his happy story. See Albin Krebs, Adolf A. Berle Jr. Dies At Age of 76, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19,
1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/02/19/archives/adolf-a-berle-jr-dies-at-age-of-76-lawyereconomist-liberal-leader.html.
145. For a description of the staglflation of the 1970s, see Robert B. Barsky & Lutz Kilian, A
Monetary Explanation of the Great Stagflation of the 1970s (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7547, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7547 [https://perma.cc/4WD7-QFKS].
146. Means Obituary, supra note 119. His book GARDINER C. MEANS, PRICING POWER AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: A STUDY BASED ON STEEL (1962), had some influence.
147. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY xlv–xlvi (Routledge 2d ed. 1991) (1932). Means identified it in the period 1953–1958.
148. ROSENOF, supra note 61, at 172.
149. Means, Corporate Power, supra note 86, at 476–77.
150. Id. at 477–78.
151. Id. at 478.
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case, the price administrator at one firm puts through a raise and
inflationary expectations cause the rest of the industry to follow.152 In all
three cases the inflation occurs even as too little money is buying from
well-stocked shelves rather than the classic inflationary case of too much
money chasing too few goods.153 But the classic case could also occur in
a stagflation context if corporate administrators raised employee pay
absent a justificatory productivity increase.154
But why should perverse pricing in one sector trigger economy-wide
inflation in an economy experiencing falling demand? We proceed to the
second part of the analysis and return to the duopolistic economy described
in the dissertation. So long, said Means, as the classically competitive part
of the economy outweighed the sector with administrative competition,
most prices went down in a recession and a Keynesian program of
monetary and fiscal correctives could work. But there was a tipping
point—“the great divide”—at which the administratively competitive
sector was large enough to cause more prices to go up than down despite
a fall in demand. Inflation and recession would combine accordingly. It
was a dangerous place to be, generating self-fulfilling inflationary
expectations.155
Means also had thoughts about what to do. He had a notion of a
“natural” price. Perverse pricing occurred in a short-term frame as
managers divided fixed costs and profit by current production volume.
Long-term pricing would work better for the economy and get us closer to
the natural price—fixed costs and profit would be divided by average
projected output over a period of years.156 Means also was more moderate
than he formerly had been in regard to implementation. He acknowledged
that private planning had been known to succeed and projected that
individual firms might well learn to correct their pricing practices and opt
for a long-term approach.157
What was moderate for Means must have sounded recklessly
interventionist to the neoclassical economists gathered at Hoover in
1982.158 The orthodox view of an inherently self-correcting economy,

152. Id. at 479.
153. Id. at 476.
154. Id. at 478–79.
155. See id. at 480.
156. Id. at 482.
157. Id. at 482, 485 (citing the Committee for Economic Development, formed by business
leaders in 1945, to work with the Commerce Department to avoid post-war recession).
158. It should be noted that the commentator on Means’s paper, Carliss Baldwin of Harvard
Business School, did not offer a flat, classical rejection of Means. Baldwin’s comment was a measured
discussion in which she pointed out where Means’s views were compatible with the current pricing
literature and where they were not. See Carliss Y. Baldwin, Administered Prices Fifty Years Later: A
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dispatched to the wilderness for the half-century after 1932, was returning
to the mainstream in response to the policy failures of the 1970s.159 Many
of those responsible for its articulation as a theory of the firm—Demsetz,
Fama, and Jensen—gave papers at Hoover.160 And those who would soon
be responsible for the new theory’s cross-disciplinary arbitrage to law,
Easterbrook and Fischel, were in the audience.161
One suspects that Means was well able to handle himself, even in
that crowd and at 85 years of age. Still, it was a moment of radical change
going against everything he stood for. Not only was orthodoxy back and
full of energy in the academic world, but 1982 was the year in which
inflation finally started to fall and the stock market finally advanced
beyond its early 1970s peak.162 The Reagan expansion was on and it finally
solved the stagflation problem.163 Means’s theory of perverse pricing, an
in-the-moment intervention only a year earlier, had suddenly become
history.
But there were twists and turns in store for the orthodox restoration
as well, as least so far as concerned The Modern Corporation. The idea at
the conference was to consign the separation of ownership and control to
the dustbin of history on the occasion of its half century. The papers and
comments were impressive and the participants doubtlessly left Palo Alto
with a sense of a job well done.
Easterbrook and Fischel thereafter successfully took the new
orthodoxy to corporate legal theory, turning what was implicit in Jensen
and Meckling’s original principal–agent model,164 along with the papers
presented at Hoover, into a sequence of normative assertions. Their
contractarianism offered an overarching account of successful marketbased control of corporate governance, an account that banished any

Comment on Gardiner C. Means: Corporate Power in the Marketplace, 26 J. L. & ECON. 487, 488–
96 (1983).
159. William W. Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare, 74 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 767, 777–80 (2017).
160. For a review of the literature, see William W. Bratton Jr., The Nexus of Contracts
Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 415–20 (1989).
161. See Williamson, supra note 26.
162. A look at the Macrotrends 100-year Dow Jones Historical Chart confirms this. The chart is
CPI-adjusted and shows an historical low of 2,110 in June 1982. The market turns up in August and
then moves up more sharply in September, finishing the year at 2,703. It continues its upward path but
for blips in 1987 and 1989 until the collapse of the tech bubble in 2000. Dow Jones—100 Year
Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/1319/dow-jones-100-year-historicalchart [https://perma.cc/BT3G-B2AY].
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problems stemming from separated ownership and control.165 There
followed a claim that the inherited governance regime was economically
rational,166 and there should be a presumption against having any more
corporate law than already exists.167 The account’s plausibility much
depended on a vigorous takeover corrective.
But hostile takeovers ceased in the wake of the economic collapse of
1989 and failed to restart in tandem with economic recovery a couple of
years later.168 A public choice story circulated to explain their
disappearance. Managers seeking renewed insulation from the markets
had gone to state legislatures and appealed to state judiciaries to promote
anti-takeover statutes and otherwise validate takeover defensive
measures.169 The defenses appeared to be effective. It followed that in the
post-takeover era agency costs were chronically and suboptimally high,
undercutting Easterbrook and Fischel’s market success story.170 Thus did
the separation of ownership and control return to center stage as the
problem that corporate law needed to solve, a late twentieth-century
reenactment of Berle and Means’s Depression era reversal of orthodoxy.
But the replay came with its own twist. Although a law reform agenda was
implied, it was not a law reform agenda following from a diagnosis of
irretrievable market failure. To the contrary, the idea was to clear barriers
so that market control could finally be made to work. Agency cost
reduction through shareholder empowerment was the goal, and process
reforms were thought to be a necessary means to the end.171
However, that diagnosis was itself upturned after the turn of this
century, when hedge fund activists managed to overcome management
insulation within the existing process context without the benefit of a law
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168. For a brief history, see Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and
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123–33 (2001).
169. Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 457, 461–62 (1988).
170. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641, 644–45 (1996); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
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L. REV. 833, 865–70 (2005) (recommending expansion of the zone shareholder legislative access to
the corporate charter and the state of incorporation decision); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 699–702 (2007) (recommending a right to replace all
incumbents every two or three years).

616

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:591

reform assist.172 This was shareholder empowerment for real, and it came
forth as a classic example of market correction. The correction was, of
course, a long time in coming, but it was otherwise very much along the
lines earlier predicted by Easterbrook and Fischel. It also implied yet
another eclipse for Berle and Means. Gilson and Gordon accurately
captured the moment when, in 2013, they observed that the separation of
ownership and control has disappeared because shareholders now value
(and exercise) their franchise to shape business policy.173
CONCLUSION
This essay recounts a succession of successes and comeuppances and
comings and goings. First comes an external shock in the form of a Great
Depression. Reacting to it, Berle and Means depose the reigning
classicists, who querulously reject the theoretical part of Means’s
dissertation on their way out. Berle and Means’s new corporatism then
enjoys a brief ascendance but quickly implodes, compromising Means’s
reputation and causing Berle to make major adjustments to stay relevant.
Meanwhile, different sorts of Keynesians come and go in the background
in response to the economy’s performance; ironically, their short runs of
influence were built into the very theory they deployed. An external shock
again disrupts things with the stagflation of the 1970s. This consigns Berle
to history even as it briefly returns Means to center stage. But its primary
beneficiaries turn out to be the new purveyors of classical orthodoxy, who
promptly move to remove The Modern Corporation from the policy stage
once and for all. That goal proves surprisingly difficult to accomplish and
only comes about decades later as an incidental effect of a twenty-first
century hedge fund investment strategy.
The central actor in all of this is the economy, the performance of
which consistently upends theories that ask too much in the way of
coordination by its free market side or, alternatively, go too far in
dismissing the free market’s corrective capacity.
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